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Abstract Using two different data sources—municipal level data and individual data—we
consider several hitherto unexplored aspects of the relationship between voting technology
and election outcomes. We distinguish between introductory and permanent effects of elec-
tronic voting, and between national and municipal elections. We test for a possible asymme-
try between the effect of moving from paper ballots to electronic voting, and vice versa, and
we control for polling station density. We ﬁnd a positive but temporary effect of electronic
voting on voter turnout, a negative effect on the fraction of residual votes, and no effect on
the share of left wing parties.
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1 Introduction
After having served democracies for decades, the paper ballot is being replaced by tech-
nologically more advanced ways of casting a vote in many countries. But the trend toward
voting by touching a screen, pushing a button, or clicking a mouse is not uncontroversial.
Problems associated with voting technology have been reported for Belgium, Brazil, Es-
tonia, France, Germany, India, Ireland, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States,
Switzerland, and other countries.1 While vulnerability to fraud is a central concern, elec-
1See, e.g., for the United States, New York Times. 2007. “Florida Acts to Eliminate Touch-Screen Voting
System” and “Trust in Paper.” (Editorial), May 5. For Germany see Kurz et al. (2007) and for Ireland Com-
mission on Electronic Voting (2004).
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tronic voting has also been criticized for not sufﬁciently protecting the legal right to cast
a vote conﬁdentially. Shortly before the Dutch parliamentary elections in November 2006,
it was found that votes cast with electronic voting machines of a speciﬁc make could be
traced from a distance with specialized equipment.2 As a response, a number of municipal-
ities, including Amsterdam, reverted to paper ballots for casting votes. In 2007, the Dutch
government outlawed the use of all existing voting machines.
These events stress the need for insight into the possible effects of voting technologies
on election outcomes. Although quite a few studies have been carried out in this ﬁeld, most
of these rely on cross-sectional analysis (e.g., Brady et al. 2001; Herron and Wand 2007;
Kimball et al. 2004; Knack and Kropf 2003; Tomz and Van Houweling 2003). However,
as shown by Ansolabehere and Stewart (2005), cross-sectional analyses appear to be seri-
ously misspeciﬁed. Ansolabehere and Stewart (2005) use a ﬁxed effects panel data analysis
to study the effect of voting technology on the proportion of residual (uncounted) votes in
presidential, gubernatorial, and senatorial elections the United States. They conclude that
existing voting technologies differ signiﬁcantly in their performance with respect to residual
votes. Ansolabehere and Stuart show that most of the variation in the residual vote is at-
tributable to unobservable county characteristics. Therefore, they stress that cross-sectional
analysis is not appropriate to study the effects of voting equipment.
Lott (2008) studies non-voted ballots using panel data from Ohio covering the presiden-
tial elections in 1992, 1996, and 2000. He concludes that different voting technologies give
rise to different degrees of “voter fatigue”. While non-voting increases with all technologies
as voters move down the ballot to races that are deemed to be less important, this increase
varies systematically with the type of voting system used. Lott stresses that systems that
produce fewer non-votes in presidential elections may produce more non-votes for other
ofﬁces.
Apart from having an impact on residual votes, voting technology might also inﬂuence
voter turnout and election results. Card and Moretti (2007) analyze the effects of touch-
screen voting using data on the 2000 and 2004 US presidential elections. They conclude
that this has had a negative effect on voter turnout, and a small but statistically signiﬁcant
positive effect on electoral support for George Bush. Because the effect was not larger in
swing states, or in states with a Republican Secretary of State, the authors conclude that
it was probably not the result of irregularities or fraud. Card and Moretti do not make a
distinction between temporary and permanent effects of a change in voting technology. It is
conceivablethataswitchtoanewtechnologytemporarilyaffectselectionoutcomes,without
having a permanent effect.
Apart from an effect on the residual vote rate, voter turnout and election results, voting
technology may inﬂuence the number of mistakenly cast votes. Dee (2007) presents evi-
dence that punch-card systems signiﬁcantly increased the frequency of this kind of error in
the 2003 Californian gubernatorial recall election.
Instead of looking at actual elections, Herrnson et al. (2008) rely on expert reviews of
voting systems and on laboratory experiments to analyze the effects of voting technology.
They conclude that some combinations of voting systems, ballot formats and voting tasks
lead to more errors than others. E.g., when citizens can vote for more than one candidate
for some ofﬁces, paper ballots, optical scan systems and standard touch screen systems are
more accurate than systems that present the entire ballots at one time.
2The website of a Dutch pressure group against electronic voting contains links to various reports
and video clips highlighting such problems, some of which are available in English. See http://www.
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The present paper supplements previous studies of the effect of voting technology on
residual votes, voter turnout and election results in a number of ways. First, by considering a
sequence of nine different Dutch elections during the period 1994–2006, we can distinguish
between the impact of the introduction of electronic voting and its more permanent impact.
Since the introduction of electronic voting usually goes along with informational campaigns
and extra media attention, these two effects are likely to be different.
Second, we distinguish between national and municipal elections. The distinction is of
interest since in a system of proportional representation (as in the Netherlands), incentives
for fraud are potentially larger in municipal elections than in elections for the national Par-
liament. This is because it takes fewer votes to change election outcomes at the local level.
Thus, if we ﬁnd that the effect of electronic voting is larger in municipal elections than in
national elections, this might be interpreted as an indication of irregularities.
Third, while previous empirical results typically rely on one-time changes from paper
ballots to electronic voting, our data also include a number of reverse changes as a result
of the November 2006 events. This allows us to consider possible asymmetries between the
effect of moving from paper ballots to electronic voting and vice versa.
Fourth, as voting machines are expensive, their introduction may go along with a reduc-
tion in the number of polling stations. Since this increases individuals’ average distance to a
polling station—and hence costs of voting—polling station density is crucial to control for
in establishing the causal impact of electronic voting on elections outcomes, in particular
voter turnout. Previous studies ignore this.
Finally, while previous work seems to be focused entirely on the United States, we
present evidence from the Netherlands. Using two different data sources—municipal level
data on actual voting behavior and a panel survey among eligible voters—we estimate the
effects of voting technology on voter turnout, election results (the share of left wing par-
ties), and the residual vote rate. We ﬁnd a small positive but temporary effect of electronic
voting on voter turnout, and a strong negative effect on the share of residual votes. We do
not ﬁnd an effect on the share of left wing parties, either in municipal, or in national elec-
tions.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes voting technology in the Nether-
lands and the municipal level data we use. The empirical analysis of the municipal level data
is discussed in Section 3, and Section 4 presents the results. The robustness check based on
individual-level data is presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Voting technology in the Netherlands and municipal level data
The Netherlands (16 million inhabitants) has three territorial levels of government: the na-
tional government, 12 provinces and (in 2006) 458 municipalities. Each level has its own
government, and a parliament (or council) which is elected by a system of proportional rep-
resentation. With very few exceptions, governments are formed by a coalition of political
parties. All Dutch nationals aged 18 or more are entitled to vote, except those expressly
excluded (e.g., the mentally ill). Citizens of other countries of the European Union residing
in the Netherlands can vote in municipal elections, as can residents of other countries who
have resided legally in the Netherlands for at least ﬁve years.
There is only one election at a time, so ballots do not list several races, like, e.g., in
the United States. Dutch ballots list the participating political parties (in columns) and the
persons running for these parties (in rows). People vote by selecting one of the persons on
the ballot. Although there are no more than ten parties that play a signiﬁcant role in Dutch162 Public Choice (2009) 139: 159–170
Table 1 Voting in the Netherlands
Municipal elections National elections
(288 municipalities) (319 municipalities)
1994 1998 2002 2006 1994 1998 2002 2003 2006
Voter turnout (percentage) 69.4 65.2 63.5 63.2 82.0 77.0 82.2 83.1 82.9
Percentage left wing votes 29.5 28.0 23.8 29.8 40.3 44.5 28.9 38.0 39.4
Percentage residual votes 0.432 0.271 0.226 1.000 0.275 0.152 0.121 0.100 0.131
Fraction electronic voting 0.361 0.722 0.917 0.962 0.373 0.734 0.922 0.937 0.937
Fraction voting technology changea 0 . 1 8 8 0 . 3 5 4 0 . 1 8 4 0 . 0 1 7 0000 . 0 1 6 0 . 0 3 1
F r a c t i o n r e v e r t e d t o p a p e r b a l l o t ––––––––0 . 0 2 8
Number of polling stations per 0.897 0.832 0.804 0.774 0.907 0.841 0.810 0.804 0.781
1000 eligible voters
Fraction allowing to vote at polling – – – 0.549 ––––0 . 6 2 1
station of choice
aFraction where a different voting technology was used than in the preceding local, provincial or national
election. Note that Fraction electronic voting may increase even when Fraction voting technology change is
zero, as electronic voting may have been introduced in elections for a different government level
national politics, in some elections, more than 25 parties compete, some of which only exist
locally.
Municipalities are responsible for organizing both the municipal and national elections.
They decide what voting technology to use, and how many polling stations to set up. In the
past two decades, virtually all municipalities replaced paper ballots by direct-record elec-
tronic (DRE) voting machines (Table 1). Mechanical voting systems (punch cards, lever
machines) have never been used in the Netherlands, except in a small-scale and disastrous
experiment in the 1960s. Paper ballots are hand-counted. Two competing Dutch ﬁrms pro-
vided the electronic voting machines, one of them (Nedap) having by far the largest market
share. Election dates are uniform in all municipalities, with the exception of local elections
in merging municipalities, which we exclude from our study. Other election regulations are
uniform across the country.
We collected data on voting technology by contacting all individual municipalities. For
some municipalities we failed to establish exactly when DREs were introduced, as local
ofﬁcials ﬁnd it more difﬁcult to provide that information the further the moment lies back
in history. We therefore decided to focus on the municipal council elections in 1994, 1998,
2002, and 2006, and the national elections (for parliament) in 1994, 1998, 2002, 2003, and
2006. Data on election outcomes and on demographic control variables were obtained from
Statistics Netherlands.3 Another complication is the ongoing process of municipal mergers.
We constructed a panel dataset of all municipalities that existed in the same form during
the period 1994–2006. This leaves us with a sample of 319 municipalities that covers about
3Data on the number of polling stations per municipality before 2006 are from Statistics Netherlands
(www.cbs.nl). For 2006, we collected these data ourselves. For the 1994 national elections, the Statistics
Netherlands data contain four very unlikely values for residual votes (with a share of residual votes of up
to 50%). These have been eliminated from the dataset.Public Choice (2009) 139: 159–170 163
two-thirds of eligible voters.4 As mentioned, a small number of municipalities reverted to
paper and pencil ballots just prior to the November 2006 national elections. See Table 1 for
details.
3 Empirical analysis
Because DREs were introduced in different elections in different municipalities, we are
able to hold constant the many other factors at the municipal level that inﬂuence election
outcomes. Using the municipal level data on actual voting behavior, we estimate separate
models for three types of election outcomes: voter turnout, the share of left wing parties,
and residual vote rate. Residual votes are votes cast but not attributed to one of the candi-
dates. A residual vote can be due to an error, or to an intentionally invalid or blank vote.
When paper ballots are used, voters can fail to tick one box clearly. When electronic voting
equipment is used, it is still possible to cast a blank vote, by pushing the appropriate button.
However, errors on behalf of the voter leading to a residual vote are virtually impossible.
We use three types of explanatory variables. First, we include variables describing the
voting technology that was used (dummies for electronic voting, and for a change in voting
technology). The inclusion of the voting technology change dummy allows us to assess
whether the effects of voting technology are temporary or permanent. For example, some
people might ﬁnd new technology confusing and therefore not vote,5 but such an effect
could disappear as soon as once-new technology has become familiar. By the same token,
the introduction of a new way of voting is typically accompanied by extra publicity, as the
municipality informs voters how to use the new equipment.
We also include two variables related to the (time) costs of voting. The ﬁrst is a dummy
for whether voters were allowed to vote at the polling station of their own choice rather
than at the station in the ward where they reside. This new option, which was introduced
in the 2006 municipal elections by about half of the municipalities, allows people, e.g., to
vote in the vicinity of their work, or where they shop. The second is the number of polling
stations per 1000 eligible voters. We include the latter variable since municipalities appear
to substantially reduce the number of polling stations upon introduction of electronic voting
machines in order to save costs. A lower number of polling stations not only increases the
average travel costs of voting, but may also result in longer lines at the remaining stations.
Haspel and Knotts (2005), studying the 2001 Atlanta mayoral race, ﬁnd that small differ-
ences in the distance to the polls may have a signiﬁcant effect on voter turnout. For the
present dataset, the coefﬁcient in a regression of the number of polling stations per 1000 in-
habitants on a dummy for electronic voting (controlling for municipal ﬁxed effects and year
dummies) is −0.114 (t-value −11.0), implying a strong and highly signiﬁcant reduction in
the average number of polling stations by about 11%. Given this strong correlation, failure
to control for the number of polling stations is likely to induce a downward bias in the effect
of electronic voting.6
4Our sample for municipal elections is smaller (288) for two reasons. First, municipalities that were about to
merge in 2007 did not hold local elections in 2006. Second, municipalities that were merged in 1993 did not
hold local elections in 1994.
5Roseman and Stephenson (2005) ﬁnd that after a statewide change to DREs, turnout among the elderly was
lower than before in Georgia’s gubernatorial elections.
6There are several reports of precincts not being allocated enough voting machines during the 2004 Presiden-
tial election in the United States; see, for example, http://copperas.com/machinery.164 Public Choice (2009) 139: 159–170
Second, we control for time-varying demographic indicators (fraction of women, people
aged 18–30, aged 65+, divorced, single, number of inhabitants, and number of inhabitants
per square kilometer). Finally, we include municipality speciﬁc ﬁxed effects to control for
time-invariant unobservable determinants of voting behavior (Hausman tests strongly reject
the random effects speciﬁcation in all cases), and year dummies to ﬁlter out nationwide
swings in voter sentiment.
We estimate by weighted least squares. We use the number of eligible voters in each
municipality in 1998 as weights. Estimating a linear probability model on the basis of ag-
gregate data complicates the calculation and interpretation of standard errors. The error term
in the linear probability model at the individual level has variance pi(1 − pi),w h e r epi is
individual i’s probability to vote (or another outcome). The error term in the model at the
municipality level has variance (1/n2)

i pi(1−pi),w h e r en is the number of eligible vot-
ers. Thus the appropriate weighting factor would be n/

i pi(1−pi) rather than n,a n d
using n as an approximation introduces heterogeneity in the aggregate error terms. Also,
in the present ﬁxed-effects setting, standard errors within municipalities are likely to ex-
hibit autocorrelation (Bertrand et al. 2004). Ignoring this risks perceiving signiﬁcant effects
where none exist. We therefore report t-values based on robust standard errors clustered by
municipality, which are typically larger than uncorrected standard errors.
4R e s u l t s
Before we turn to our statistical analysis, we present our municipal level data graphically.
This allows us to visualize voting trends, and, more importantly, to show whether there
are pre-existing levels or trends that render early and late adopters of DREs incomparable.
This is important because, in our setup, identiﬁcation is based on differences in the timing
of the introduction of DREs across municipalities. We compare changes in municipalities
that adopt DREs in different elections. In order to do so, municipalities that adopt DREs at
different moments must be comparable.7
Figure1showsvotingpattersinnationalelectionsseparatelyformunicipalitiesthatintro-
duced DREs before 1998, for those that adopted DREs in 1998, and for those that introduced
DREs after 1998 or not at all. For both voter turnout and the share of left-wing votes, trends
are identical, and levels similar. No effect of the use of DREs is apparent from Fig. 1.T h e
same holds true for municipal elections (Fig. 2). As far as turnout and the left wing vote are
concerned, municipalities introducing DREs at different times seem to be comparable, and
the effect of DREs appears small or non-existent.
This is not the case when we look at residual vote rates, however. In 1994, municipalities
that already had introduced electronic voting at the time have a lower share of residual votes
than municipalities still using paper ballots. This is true for both municipal and national
elections. The reason might be that DREs are characterized by a lower residual vote rate
than paper ballots. In 1998, the share of residual votes in municipalities introducing DREs
drops to the same low level as found in early adopters. Again, this is true for both municipal
and national elections. But here the similarity ends. In the 2002 and 2003 national elec-
tions, the residual vote rate decreases in municipalities which had not yet adopted DREs in
1998. The share of residual votes remains higher in this group of ‘late adopters’, but this
is unsurprising, as some of these did not adopt DREs at all (Table 1). In the 2006 national
7Ideally, we would like to instrument electronic voting (Besley and Case 2000), but suitable instruments are
unavailable. The cost of DREs, a potential instrument, does not vary across municipalities.Public Choice (2009) 139: 159–170 165
Fig. 1 Voting patterns by year of adoption of DREs; National elections (percentages)
Fig. 2 Voting patterns by year of adoption of DREs; Municipal elections (percentages)
elections, the share of residual votes increases for all categories in a similar way. Together,
these national election voting patterns seem to suggest a negative effect of DREs on the
residual vote. There are no indications that early and late adopters are not comparable as far
as national elections are concerned.
However, from Fig. 2 it is evident that, in municipal elections, localities that had not (yet)
adopted DREs in 1998 had high residual vote rates in 1994 compared with municipalities
that had used DREs in 1998, but not in 1994. This difference cannot be attributed to voting
technology, as both these categories used paper ballots in 1994. In the 2006 municipal elec-
tions, the residual vote rate increases sharply in the group that adopted DREs in 1998, while
this share remains much lower in the other groups. Thus, municipalities that adopted DREs
in different years may not be comparable with respect to residual vote patterns in municipal
elections. Blank votes are sometimes used as protest against “politics” in general, especially
in municipal elections. Because the extent to which blank votes are cast in municipal elec-
tions depends on local circumstances which change from election to election (Brady et al.
2001), an analysis of residual votes is perhaps most fruitful at the national level. Therefore,
we will restrict our analysis of municipal elections to turnout and the left wing vote.166 Public Choice (2009) 139: 159–170
Although ﬁgures may be useful to display voting patterns, they cannot tell us whether
there is a relationship between voting technology and election outcomes. For that purpose,
we need a statistical analysis. The upper panel of Table 2 shows that electronic voting seems
to have a positive effect on voter turnout in municipal elections (column 1) and a nega-
tive effect in national elections (column 4). After controlling for polling station density, this
different effect on local and national elections disappears: the negative effect of electronic
voting in national elections becomes insigniﬁcant (column 5), while the positive effect in
municipal elections gains strength (column 2). Including a dummy for changes in voting
technology reveals that only two thirds of the effect of DREs in municipal elections is per-
manent (column 3). The coefﬁcient of the permanent effect is not statistically signiﬁcant at
the 95% conﬁdence level. The introductory effect in national elections is positive and sig-
niﬁcant (column 6), but this is based on only a very small number of ﬁrst-time electronic
voting cases—most municipalities that introduced electronic voting did so in a municipal
election; cf. Table 1.8
The omission of the number of polling stations induces a downward bias in the effects co-
efﬁcient for electronic voting. This was expected, because polling station density has a pos-
itive effect on turnout. Thus, municipalities intent on increasing turnout could consider rais-
ing the number of polling stations. However, a more cost-effective way to promote turnout
is allowing voters to vote at the polling station of their own choice. Table 2 shows that this
increases turnout by about one percentage point in both municipal and national elections.
Our result suggests that the signiﬁcant negative effect of touch-screen voting on turnout,
especially for Hispanics, reported by Card and Moretti (2007), might be partly due to not
controlling for touch-screen voting machine density. Thus, in addition to the possible in-
terpretations suggested by Card and Moretti (intimidation, distrust, limited English proﬁ-
ciency), lower turnout for Hispanics might be related to higher voting costs and a more
limited access to transportation.
Voting technology might also inﬂuence the shares of the competing political parties.
Conventional wisdom holds that high turnout favors Democrats in the United States and left
wing parties in Europe, although this view is contentious (e.g., Nagel and McNulty 1996).
It is conceivable that DREs attract or deter groups (e.g., the elderly) that tend to vote for
particular parties. We investigate this possibility by looking at the share of left-wing parties;
see the middle panel of Table 2. While the coefﬁcients suggest that the left wing share drops
when electronic voting machines are used, the effects are statistically insigniﬁcant. Includ-
ing voter turnout in the regression lowers the DRE coefﬁcient even further in municipal
elections. There is no signiﬁcant effect of turnout on the left wing vote, however.
We ﬁnd that electronic voting does lower the proportion of residual votes; see the lower
panel of Table 2. Our result differs from that of Ansolabehere and Stewart (2005), who ﬁnd
that DREs perform comparably to paper in US gubernatorial and senatorial elections, and
worse in presidential elections.9 Here, we look at national elections only, as municipalities
adopting DREs at different moments may not be comparable with respect to the share of
residual votes (see above). The negative effect of DREs on residual votes is almost entirely
related to electronic voting itself, not its introduction. Electronic voting reduces the residual
vote rate by as much as 0.13 percentage points. The inclusion of turnout does not affect the
8Electronic voting has been introduced in most municipalities in local elections, in some municipalities in
national elections and in a few in provincial elections. This explains why “Fraction electronic voting” shown
in Table 1 does not increase with “Fraction voting technology change” reported in the same table.
9Lott (2008) also ﬁnds that non-voting depends on the type of voting system used, but his dataset does not
contain paper ballots, so we cannot compare our result to his.Public Choice (2009) 139: 159–170 167
Table 2 Effects of voting technology on election outcomes
Municipal elections National elections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Voter turnouta
Electronic voting 1.50 1.96 1.45 −0.43 −0.23 −0.17
(2.1) (2.5) (1.7) (−2.2) (−1.3) (−1.0)
Technology change – – 0.52 – – 1.44
(1.7) (3.6)
Number of polling stations – 5.48 5.23 – 2.29 2.30
per 1,000 eligible voters (3.1) (3.0) (3.8) (3.8)
Voting at polling station of 1.27 1.35 1.33 1.25 1.25 1.12
choice (3.1) (3.4) (3.3) (5.4) (5.4) (5.0)
Adjusted R-squared 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.97
Share of left-wing partiesb
Electronic voting −0.52 −0.21 −1.00 −0.99
(−0.4) (−0.2) (−1.6) (−1.6)
Technology change 0.59 0.71 −0.70 −0.74
(0.9) (1.1) (−0.9) (−0.9)
Number of polling stations 0.37 1.50 −1.03 −1.13
per 1,000 eligible voters (0.1) (0.5) (−0.8) (−0.9)
Voting at polling station of −0.49 −0.20 0.63 0.60
choice (−0.4) (−0.2) (1.5) (1.4)
Voter turnout – −0.22 – 0.03
(−1.6) (0.6)
Adjusted R-squared 0.93 0.94 0.98 0.98
Residual vote sharec
Electronic voting −0.13 −0.13
(−6.3) (−6.2)
Technology change 0.05 0.04
(2.3) (2.3)
Number of polling stations 0.13 0.12
per 1,000 eligible voters (2.3) (2.2)
Voting at polling station of −0.02 −0.02
choice (−2.0) (−2.2)
Voter turnout – 0.004
(1.6)
Adjusted R-squared 0.85 0.85
Fixed-effect panel weighted least squares estimation, using the number of eligible voters in 1998 as weights;
t-values in parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered by municipality. All estimations include
municipal ﬁxed effects, year dummies, and other controls (see text)
aDependent variable: voter turnout, deﬁned as all votes cast, whether counted or not, as a percentage of the
number of eligible voters
bDependent variable: percentage share of votes cast for left wing parties (SP, GL, PvdA and D66)
cDependent variable: percentage share of residual votes in total votes cast168 Public Choice (2009) 139: 159–170
voting equipment coefﬁcient, and turnout has no signiﬁcant effect on the share of residual
votes. Interestingly, both polling station density and changes in voting technology increase
the share of residual votes, but these effects are not large.
Our data allow testing for a possible asymmetry between the effect of moving from pa-
per ballots to electronic voting and the effect of a reverse change (prior to the 2006 national
election). To this end, we include a dummy for the reverse change, and test whether its
coefﬁcient is the negative of the coefﬁcient on electronic voting. In all cases p-values ex-
ceeded 0.1. Thus, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the effects are symmetric. The power
of the test is limited, given the small number of reverse changes in the data. However, while
the fraction of municipalities that reverted to paper ballots is 3%, the change applied to 8%
of the voters.
5 Robustness check
As a robustness check, we also analyze data on self-reported voting behavior from a survey
among eligible voters. The data are from the CentERpanel, a representative sample of the
Dutch population, except the institutionalized.10 For both the 2003 and the 2006 national
elections, respondents were asked whether they voted and, if so, for which party.11 In the
survey, the fraction of respondents reporting to have voted is higher than the actual observed
turnout (0.93 versus 0.80, both numbers averaged over 2003 and 2006). This is a common
phenomenon, which has been noted before in other settings (see e.g., Silver et al. 1986).
Social pressure is an important determinant of turnout (Gerber et al. 2008), so people may
be reluctant to confess they did not vote. However, this bias is unlikely to be related to
voting technology. The shares of left wing votes in both data sources are closer to each other
(0.49 versus 0.45). Of the 2,637 people participating in the panel, 1,964 answered the voting
behavior questions (74%). We were able to identify the voting technology (using zip code
information) for 1,466 respondents. Of these, 40 lived in a municipality using DREs in 2003
and paper ballots in 2006, while 26 lived in a municipality using paper in 2003 and DREs in
2006. For the remaining respondents, the voting technology was the same in both elections.
Table 3 reports regression results from two linear probability models with individual
speciﬁc ﬁxed effects, for having voted and for having voted left wing. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant
effects of the option to vote at the polling station of own choice, but no signiﬁcant effects
for the voting technology variable. This result is similar to that of the analysis of municipal
level data. Again, we do not ﬁnd evidence for an asymmetry between the effect of moving
from paper ballots to electronic voting and the effect of a reverse change (not reported).
6C o n c l u s i o n
We ﬁnd that electronic voting has had a small positive effect on voter turnout in Dutch
elections, when used for the ﬁrst time. The permanent effect is not statistically signiﬁcant at
the 95% conﬁdence level.
10See www.centerdata.nl.
11The ﬁrst question was worded as follows (translated from Dutch): “Last Wednesday, elections for parlia-
ment took place. Did you vote?” (1. Yes, I voted myself; 2. Yes, I mandated someone to vote on my behalf;
3. No). The second question was: “For which party did you vote?” (followed by a list of parties, including
“blank”, for the respondent to check).Public Choice (2009) 139: 159–170 169
Table 3 Effects of voting technology on voting behavior
Voted Voted left wing
Electronic voting −0.03 −0.01
(−0.1) (−0.2)
Number of polling stations per 1,000 eligible voters −0.15 0.02
(−0.4) (0.1)
Voting at polling station of choice 0.05 0.01
(5.0) (2.1)
Adjusted R-squared 0.74 0.89
N 2,932 2,725
Fixed-effect panel least squares estimation; t-values in parentheses, based on robust clustered standard errors.
Both estimations include individual speciﬁc ﬁxed effects
Electronic voting has a sizable negative impact on the number of residual votes. This is
only to be expected, as errors on behalf of the voter leading to a residual vote are virtually
impossible with electronic voting. When using voting machines, residual votes are likely to
be intentional blank votes only. This result differs from that of Ansolabehere and Stewart
(2005), who ﬁnd that DREs perform comparably to paper ballots in American gubernatorial
and senatorial elections, and worse than paper in presidential elections. This might be due
to differences between the machines used in the Netherlands and those used in the USA, or
to differences in the complexity or length of the ballots in both countries.
We do not ﬁnd an effect of voting technology on the share of left wing parties, either
in municipal, or in national elections. Our results therefore do not provide indications of
voting irregularities related to voting equipment. Also, we do not ﬁnd any evidence of an
asymmetry between the effects of introducing and abandoning electronic voting.
Our results show that it is important to distinguish between the temporary effects of the
introduction ofnewvoting technology andthepermanent effects ofthesetechnologies them-
selves. Moreover, omission of the number of polling stations (which we found to decrease
upon the introduction of electronic voting) biases the coefﬁcient reﬂecting the effect of elec-
tronic voting on voter turnout downward. This might help explain the discrepancy between
our results and those reported by Card and Moretti (2007) with regard to the effect on voter
turnout.
Finally, we ﬁnd that voter turnout may be improved by allowing voters to vote at the
polling station of their own choice. This reform increased turnout by about one percentage
point in both municipal and national elections in the Netherlands.
Toconclude, theintroduction ofelectronic votingdoesnotseemtohave hadmuchimpact
on election results in the Netherlands. Of course, this is as it should be.
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